A Work of Art is Not a Barrel of Pork:The Relationship Between Private Property Rights, Moral Rights Doctrine and The Preservation of Cultural Heritage by Cheng-Davies, Tania S L
                          Cheng-Davies, T. S. L. (2016). A Work of Art is Not a Barrel of Pork: The
Relationship Between Private Property Rights, Moral Rights Doctrine and
The Preservation of Cultural Heritage. Intellectual Property Quarterly,
2016(3), 278-294.
Peer reviewed version
License (if available):
CC BY-NC
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via Sweet & Maxwell. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
1 
 
A WORK OF ART IS NOT JUST A BARREL OF PORK* – THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS, MORAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE AND THE 
PRESERVATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE  
“Works of art are the property of mankind and ownership carries with it the obligation to preserve 
them. He who neglects this duty and directly or indirectly contributes to their damage or ruin invites 
the reproach of barbarism and will be punished with the contempt of all educated people, now and in 
future ages.” – Attributed to JW von Goethe1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On 15 May 1990, at Christie’s in New York, Japanese paper tycoon Ryoei Saito, purchased Van 
Gogh’s Portrait of Dr Gachet for US$82.5 million, and two days later made another bid for and won 
Renoir’s Au Moulin de la Galette, this time at Sotheby’s for US$78.1 million.2 At the time, Saito 
made headline news as not only was the combined sum of US$160 million an astonishing amount of 
money even for paintings as celebrated as these two, the sale price for Dr Gachet had set the world 
record for the highest sum ever paid to date for a work of art. Saito made headlines again a year later 
when he announced that he wished to have the two paintings cremated with him on his death, so as to 
save on inheritance tax, sending shockwaves throughout the art world.3 Such was the public’s 
horrified reaction that Saito backtracked and claimed that he had only been joking.4 Since Saito’s 
death in 1996 however, while the Renoir has been accounted for,5 the whereabouts of Dr Gachet 
remains a mystery.6  
The principal issue which arises in the above scenario and instantly springs to mind is the 
question of whether the owner of a work of art, particularly one which is so celebrated and revered, 
should have the right to destroy it. The right to destroy is an ancient right, encapsulated in Roman law 
as ius abutendi, a right of full dominion over property, including the right to abuse or destroy the 
                                                          
Tania Cheng-Davies, PhD Candidate, University of Bristol. Email: tc13445@bristol.ac.uk. This article forms 
part of a doctoral thesis to be submitted to the University of Bristol Law School.  
* See note 122 below. 
1 Quoted in Julius S Held, ‘Alteration and Mutilation of Works of Art’ (1963) 62 The South Atlantic Quarterly 
4, 26. 
2 Terry McCarthy, ‘The Last of the Big Spender: Ryoei Saito last week: under arrest and in deep trouble, a far 
cry from his coup at Christie's’ The Independent (16 November 1993). 
3 Yumiko Ono and Marcus W. Brauchli, ‘Shogun of Shuzuoka: Japanese Tycoon who Dazzled Art World Hits a 
Rough Patch’ The Wall Street Journal (28 May 1991). 
4 ‘Art Collector: 'Burial' Plans a Jest’ Los Angeles Times (15 May 1991). 
5 M. Guides, Art + Paris Impressionists & Post-Impressionists: The Ultimate Guide to Artists, Paintings and 
Places in Paris and Normandy (Museyon 2011) 39. 
6 David Osborne, ‘Lost Van Gogh feared cremated with owner’ The Independent (27 July 1999). 
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same.7 The principle reflects the recognition of a sacrosanct right to private property with which third 
parties should not interfere, and is a principle which is ensconced within the liberal conception of 
property rights in Anglo-American law.8 Numerous legal scholars have described the scope of private 
property rights, and leading scholars such as Honore and Roscoe Pound have certainly acknowledged 
that private property rights include the right to destroy.9 However, the question is whether works of 
art constitute a special category of property which should be exempted from the application of ius 
abutendi.10  
This is not only a question of private property rights but also a bigger ethical question as to 
whether the world at large has a moral interest in preventing the destruction of such masterpieces, or 
indeed in the general disposal of such works, even though these works are in private ownership. The 
tension is obvious: private property rights are generally accepted to be absolute, and they include the 
right to destroy. However, works such as the Van Gogh and Renoir can be seen to be part of our 
common cultural heritage and hence it is arguable that they deserve special protection, even against 
sacrosanct private property rights. The most passionate and articulate advocate for such special 
protection is Professor Joseph Sax, who in Playing Darts with a Rembrandt acknowledges the 
tension, saying that “the very idea that things can be both private goods serving private needs, and at 
the same time objects in which the public has a crucial stake, can be difficult to grasp”.11 However, he 
argues that even though a Rembrandt owned by a private individual does not belong to us in the first 
place, and that its destruction therefore would not deprive us of anything, nevertheless it is a 
“symbolic loss that can occur to others even though the thing destroyed was not theirs”.12 In his book, 
Professor Sax makes an impassioned plea for special consideration of culturally valuable or important 
items. 
In particular, this article focuses on this very tension, from a particular angle situated in moral 
rights doctrine. While copyright law governs the economic rights of a creator, for example, by 
granting the creator exclusive rights to make copies of his own work, or to distribute copies of his 
work, moral rights doctrine focuses on the creator’s personal and spiritual relationship with his work, 
even after he has divested himself of his copyright, for example, by ensuring that his works are 
correctly attributed to him (paternity right or attribution right), or that they may not be treated in a 
                                                          
7 J.G. Sprankling, International Property Law (OUP Oxford 2014), 293; B Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman 
Law (Clarendon Press 1972), 154; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, ‘The Right to Destroy’ (2005) 114 Yale Law Journal 
781, 785; Edward J McCaffery, ‘Must we have the Right to Waste?’ in Steven Munzer (ed), New Essays in the 
Legal and Philosophical Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press 2001); Roscoe Pound, ‘The Law of 
Property and Recent Juristic Thought’ [American Bar Association] (1939) 25 American Bar Association Journal 
993, 997 
8 Pound (note 7 above) p. 994, pp.996 - 97 
9 A.M. Honore, ‘Ownership’ in A.G. Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961); Pound (n 7) 997 
10 Sprankling (note 7 above) p. 298. 
11 Joseph Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt: Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures (University of 
Michigan Press 1999) 6. 
12  ibid., p. 2. 
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derogatory manner (integrity right). Although, the scope of the doctrine varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, the integrity right is widely recognised as being a core moral right. In its most common 
form, the integrity right is the right to object generally to mutilation or deformation of one’s creation. 
This is reflected in Article 6bis Berne Convention which outlines the general scope of moral rights as 
follows: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, 
the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, 
which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.  
It is however not certain if the integrity right also encompasses a right for creators to object to 
the destruction of their works. While there have been conflicting cases in France and Germany on this 
issue,13 the right has been legislated in countries such as Australia,14 Switzerland,15 and the US,16 
although primarily with respect to artistic works only. Recognition of the right has been rejected 
outright in the Netherlands recently,17 but hesitantly acknowledged in the UK.18 Generally, the 
tendency has been to avoid recognising such a right.19  It has been argued that destruction amounts to 
the ultimate form of mutilation,20 and if so, it is unclear as to why the inclusion of a right to object to 
destruction within moral rights doctrine should be viewed with this much ambiguity and ambivalence. 
One possible reason for this uncertainty lies in the accepted basis for moral rights doctrine: if its 
foundation lies in the sphere of personality rights, then its focus centres squarely on the individual 
author; however if it functions as a public interest right, then there is ample scope for arguing that the 
integrity right should also accommodate the destruction of works.21  
Several other reasons have been put forward for not recognising the right.22 The main focus of 
this article centres on one of the principal reasons: the potential prevalence of a private property right 
to destroy over the creator’s moral right to object to destruction, or at least the tension between the 
                                                          
13 Elizabeth Adeney, The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers: An International and Comparative Analysis 
(OUP 2006) at para 8.76. 
14 Copyright Act 1968, s.195AK. 
15 Swiss Copyright Act 1992, art.15, para.1. 
16 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. 
17 Judica Krikke, ‘Netherlands: copyright - no moral rights protection against destruction’ (2004) 26 European 
Intellectual Property Review N155.  
18 John P Harrison v John D Harrison, Michael Harrison t/a Streetwise Publications and Mark Hempshell 
[2010], ECDR, 3 (PCC). 
19 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Moral rights in English law - the shape of rights to come’ (1986) 8 European Intellectual 
Property Review 329, 335. 
20 Jacques de Werra, ‘Le droit a l'integrite de l'oeuvre. Etude du droit d'aauteur suisse dans une perspective de 
droit compare’ in H. Hausheer (ed), Etudes de droit suisse (Staempfli Editions 1997). 
21 Mira T Sundara Rajan, Moral Rights: Principles, Practice and New Technology (1st edn, Oxford University 
Press 2011) 45. 
22 Tania Cheng-Davies, ‘Honour in UK Copyright Law is Not 'A Trim Reckoing' - its Impact on the Destruction 
of Works of Art’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, published online 17 September 2015. 
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artist’s moral rights and the property rights of the owner over the artistic work.23 It would seem that 
generally the integrity right, in its traditionally accepted scope, would in principle prevail over private 
property rights to alter, mutilate or to otherwise transform a work in a derogatory fashion. However, 
even so, there is a bias in favour of private property rights when deciding cases involving such 
conflict.24  
Although France and Germany recognise relatively robust moral rights, to the extent that 
there is no requirement to show that the treatment of a work affects the creator’s honour or 
reputation,25 in practice, the courts have always conducted an exercise in balancing the conflicting 
interests of the parties involved: the private property interests of the owner on the one hand, and the 
moral rights of creator on the other, and in such balancing exercises, private property rights have 
generally prevailed.26 This general approach reflects the views of French jurists regarding private 
property rights i.e. that the private property rights of individuals should not be readily compromised 
even in the pursuit of a public good, except in exceptional cases.27 There is thus no bright line rule, as 
it would seem, that the integrity right takes precedence over private property rights and cases in 
France and Germany have generally resolved conflicts on an ad hoc basis with no clear set of 
guidelines.28 Considering that even though the ambit of the integrity right in its most minimalist form 
clearly encompasses at least a right to object to alteration, mutilation or deformation short of 
destruction, but that such right still plays second fiddle to private property rights in jurisdictions 
which traditionally favour moral rights, it would then appear that a right to object to destruction, the 
acceptance of which is still uncertain, would certainly fare badly.  
The concern with moral rights trampling over private property rights is also evident in the 
US’ chequered history of their copyright regime and its interaction with moral rights doctrine, prior to 
their eventual adoption of their Visual Artists Rights Act 1990 (VARA). Perkins, in a discussion of 
Crimi v Rutgers Presbyterian Church in the City of New York,29 argued that  
                                                          
23 Rajan (note 21 above) p. 41; Russell J. DaSilva, ‘Artists' Rights in France and the US’ (1981) 28 Bulletin 
Copyright Society of USA 1, 19; Francesca Garson, ‘Before that artist came along, it was just a bridge: The 
Visual Artists Rights Act and the Removal of Site-Specific Artwork’ (2002) 11 Cornell Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 203, 204. 
24 Stina Teilmann-Lock, British and French Copyright: A Historical Study of Aesthetic Implications (First edn, 
DJOF Publishing 2009) 201, 205. 
25  ibid., p. 212;  Andre Lucas, ‘Moral Right in France: towards a pragmatic approach?’ (ALAI) in respect of the 
position in France. In Germany, the prejudice is to not limited to honour or reputation but is to any legitimate 
intellectual or personal interest of the author in the work: Gillian Davies and Kevin Garnett, Moral Rights (1st 
edn, Thomson Reuters (Legal) Limited 2010) at para. 13-006. This is unlike the position in the UK or in the US 
under the provisions of VARA 1990.  
26 Teilmann-Lock (note 24 above) p. 201; Adeney (note 13 above) at para. 8.95-97 and para. 9.104-105; Davies 
and Garnett (note 25 above) at para. 13-021. 
27 See Maree Sainsbury, Moral Rights and their application in Australia (The Federation Press 2003), 25, 
quoting from Montesquieu, Marcade and Laurent. 
28 Cyrill P. Rigamonti, ‘Deconstructing Moral Rights’ (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 353, 366. 
29 Crimi v Rutgers Presbyterian Church in the City of New York 89 (NYS 2d 813) (Sup Ct 1949). 
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...to require that the defendant retains a work of art, which he does not want, or as the only 
alternative, require him to remove it, or pay damages to the artist, would be in direct conflict 
with the American view that a person can do with his property what he wishes.30 
While some American cases pre VARA support Perkins’ view and that of the court in Crimi, 
i.e. that the American courts were reluctant to recognise the existence of moral rights doctrine in 
American jurisprudence,31 other cases in the same era had recognised the need to redress such injuries 
nevertheless, through creative application of other legal principles and theories, such as those 
pertaining to libel laws and fraud.32 This indicates at least that pre VARA the American courts did 
acknowledge the injuries sustained by artists, which had to be redressed in some fashion.  
In the debates that surrounded the enactment of VARA, it was felt that the enforcement of 
moral rights would “contradict common law property notions of free alienability and absolute 
ownership against the world”.33 Similarly the UK’s grudging implementation of moral rights has been 
described as “cynical, or at least half-hearted.”34 The rather restrictive and hesitant drafting of the 
UK’s moral rights provisions was in most part influenced by the economic interests of certain groups 
rather than the interests of authors.35   
This article thus identifies several problems in this state of affairs. Firstly, mutilation or 
alteration of works of art is rectifiable and restorable, but the utter destruction of the same is not. 
Hence it is inconsistent and ironic that in principle, an artist’s objections to the mutilation/alteration of 
his work may override the property rights of the work’s owner, but not his objections against 
destruction.  Secondly, the Saito example throws into sharp relief the distressing consequences of 
allowing property rights to prevail over the moral rights of authors. While Saito may not actually have 
destroyed the paintings as he had threatened, nevertheless it was clear that it was within his legal right 
to do so. The possibility of such masterpieces facing destruction is unthinkable. The Saito example 
highlights the very issue in an extreme form: two renowned masterpieces with their fate in the hands 
of a wilful owner. While a Van Gogh will likely invoke an extreme reaction from the art world, would 
an unknown piece be met with similar opprobrium? The point however about lesser known pieces is 
that they may well be the masterpieces of the future, and hence be an indispensable element of our 
future generations’ common cultural heritage.  
                                                          
30 Charles Harvard Perkins, ‘Literary Property - Artist's Right to Prevent Destruction of his Work after Sale’ 
(1951) Washington University Law Review 124, 131. 
31 A list of these cases are referred to in Mary Lee, ‘Moral Right Doctrine: Protection of the Artist's Interest in 
his Creation after Sale’ (1950) 2 Alabama Law Review 267 at footnote 28. 
32  ibid., pp.272-79. 
33 Garson (note 23 above) p. 214. 
34 Jane C. Ginsburg, ‘Moral rights in a common law system’ (1990) 1 Entertainment Law Review 121,129. 
35 Gerald Dworkin, ‘The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Commonlaw Countries’ (1994) 19 
Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 229, 245 and 257. 
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There are numerous other instances in which works of art have been destroyed by their owners 
with impunity. One well known example occurred in the UK, where Graham Sutherland’s portrait of 
Winston Churchill was destroyed by Lady Churchill soon after Churchill’s death.36 In Australia, 
instead of selling a Picasso Lithograph, Trois Femme, in its entirety, a mail order company cut it up 
into several pieces, and offered each separate piece for sale, thus maximising the monetary return of 
the work.37 In the US, the Rockefellers commissioned Diego Rivera to execute a mural on the 
Rockefeller Centre, only to demolish the same when they decided they did not like the content of the 
mural.38 Apart from the fact that these examples comprise undoubted masterpieces, they also only 
form the mere tip of an immense iceberg comprising innumerable maimed and destroyed works of art 
in our cultural history, thus demonstrating the importance and urgency of the issues raised in this 
article. 
II. OUTLINE OF ISSUES AND CENTRAL ARGUMENTS 
The central issue which this paper addresses is the question of whether private property rights remain 
a valid objection against the recognition of the right to destroy in moral rights doctrine, with particular 
emphasis on artworks. It will be argued primarily that there are cogent reasons why works of art fall 
within a special category of private property, which is not subject to the usual rules of property. 
Following on from Joseph Sax’s plea for an exception to the absolute private property principle in 
favour of culturally important items, this article will make the argument that such an exception should 
indeed be recognised, based on the idea that art is a common good.  
This article will firstly closely examine the concept of ius abutendi, as a strand of liberal 
property theory, before considering the application of this concept to art ownership. Underlining any 
rebuff to ius abutendi involves the acceptance that the arts comprise a special category of property, 
deserving an exception to the application of ius abutendi. This argument will be made on the basis of 
the following four observations: firstly, that ius abutendi is not always applicable; secondly, that art is 
a common good and therefore it is in the public interest to preserve and protect art; thirdly, closely 
related to the common good argument, it is argued that stewardship is the more appropriate form of 
holding where cultural works are concerned; and finally, there is scope for arguing that cultural works 
possess a “special aura of worth”,39 therefore requiring and deserving some form of protection.   
In confronting the above issues and in making the aforementioned arguments, this article will 
draw heavily upon the scholarship of academics such as Sax, Merryman and Elsen, all being 
                                                          
36 Jennifer Mundy, Lost Art (Tate Publishing 2013), 100; Sax (note 11 above) p. 38. 
37 Nicholas Forrest, ‘Picasso Gets the Chop!!’ (2008)  <http://www.artmarketblog.com/2008/04/17/picasso-gets-
the-chop-artmarketblogcom/> accessed 12 January 2016. 
38 ‘Rockefeller Centers Ousts Rivera and Boards Up Mural’ (10 May 1933)  
<http://xroads.virginia.edu/~MA04/hess/RockRivera/newspapers/NYHerald_05_10_1933.html> accessed 29 
September 2014. 
39 Richard Brilliant, ‘Do Art Objects Have Rights?’ (1991) 73 The Art Bulletin 534. 
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unremitting supporters of the idea that the preservation of the arts is indubitably in the public interest, 
together with a consideration of the principles key to the development of the concept of stewardship 
in property law, as well as the concept of the common good as developed by Thomas Aquinas. This 
article will also engage with key arguments raised by art philosophers such as Tormey, Young, 
Sparshott and Goldblatt, who have deliberated over the question of whether art objects themselves 
have rights, including the right not to be destroyed.  
Crucially, the main point of the article is that if the arts are indeed a common good and that it 
deserves special recognition, treatment and protection, thus trumping private property rights, then for 
moral rights doctrine to disregard the right to object to destruction is utterly incompatible with this 
stand. It has been argued elsewhere that the question of whether moral rights doctrine offers the 
creator a right to object to destruction is dependent on how the doctrine is perceived. On the one hand, 
some academics argue that moral rights doctrine has a role in protecting cultural heritage and that, in 
the public interest of protecting cultural heritage, it should therefore encompass such a right.40 On the 
other, others are equally adamant that it is merely a bundle of individual or personality rights 
belonging to a creator, and hence is concerned with only protecting the creator, not his work. 
However, even so, what is moral rights doctrine’s rationale for protecting the creator? The underlying 
justification lies in the public interest as well. Moral rights doctrine complements and supplements the 
rights afforded by the copyright regime, which are fundamentally economic rights belonging to the 
creator, the impetus for which is driven by the public interest in “the production of new work...in 
order to enrich and diversify the whole culture”.41 Moral rights doctrine, its integrity right in 
particular, recognises and protects the intrinsic value, as opposed to the purely monetary value, of a 
work to its creator. It reflects the deeply meaningful relationship that a creator has with his work, and 
as such, it makes sense that the creator would want to protect, nurture and preserve his work, and not 
to see it maimed or destroyed.42 By recognising this aspect, and not just the commercial aspects of a 
creator’s relationship with his work, it sends a powerful message that the country’s artists, writers and 
other creators are highly valued and cherished, and it is in the public interest to send such a message.43 
By protecting and preserving creative works, it also fulfils the public interest in ensuring that quality 
authentic and original works are maintained for not only the current generation but also future 
generations.44  
                                                          
40 Patrick Masiyakurima, ‘The Trouble with Moral Rights’ [Wiley on behalf of the Modern Law Review] (2005) 
68 The Modern Law Review 411, 424; Rajan (note 21 above) p. 5. 
41 Davies and Garnett (note 25 above) at para 2-002.  
42 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Soul of Creativity: Forging a Moral Rights Law for the United States (Stanford 
University Press 2010). 
43 Burton Ong, ‘Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Integrity Rights’ (2003) 26 
Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 297, 302. 
44 P. Baldwin, The Copyright Wars: Three Centuries of Trans-Atlantic Battle (Princeton University Press 2014), 
51. 
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A more robust recognition of the right to object to destruction would ensure that no work ever fall 
victim to the caprices of the Saitos in the world. In the process, this article argues that the role of 
moral rights doctrine lies in the public interest to protect creators, and it can only do so if it also 
values the creator’s right to object to destruction of his work.  
III. PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND IUS ABUDENTI 
The key question addressed in this article is whether works of art are just like any other entity which 
might be the subject of private property or they constitute a special category of private property which 
deserve special consideration. If works of art constitute ordinary private property, are they however 
exempted from the draconian effects of the application of ius abudenti? If so, on what basis are works 
of art so exempted?   
As identified above, the liberal theory of property is the current dominant theory in the 
West,45 which has been propounded by theorists such as Locke, Bentham Austin through to Nozick 
and Rawls. Private property rights in themselves have been justified as far back as Aristotle, who in 
rejecting Plato’s ideals of communal property as being unworkable, explained that “where everyone 
has his own sphere of interest, there will not be the same ground for quarrels, and the amount of 
interest will increase, because each man will feel he is applying himself to what is his own”, 46 which 
anticipates the utilitarian justification for the liberal theory of property as we know it today. The key 
justification for Aristotle is that having private property over things ensures that the thing is cared 
for.47 In 1766, William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England describes property 
ownership as thus:  
That sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things 
of the world in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe. 
The classical utilitarians justified private property ownership by the measure of human 
happiness such ownership brings. According to JS Mill, “...the feeling of security of possession and 
enjoyment, which could not ... be had without private ownership, is of the very greatest importance as 
an element of human happiness.”48 Fellow utilitarian, Bentham defines property as an “established 
expectation of advantage” in the thing that is owned. Austin describes property holding in more 
specific terms: “...any right which gives the entitled party an indefinite power or liberty of using or 
disposing of the subject” which reflects the wholly autonomous characteristic of the individual in that 
                                                          
45 Ross Zucker, ‘The Underlying Logic of Liberal Property Theory’ in Democratic Distributive Justice 
(Cambridge University Press 2003), 27. 
46 Gregory S. Alexander and Eduardo M. Penalver, An Introduction to Property Theory (Cambridge University 
Press 2012) ,17. 
47 McCaffery (note 7 above) p.78. 
48 J.S. Mill quoted in Charles Norton, Letter to Chauncey Wright, 13 September 1870 referred to in Edward H. 
Madden, ‘Charles Eliot Norton on Art and Morals’ (1957) 18 Journal of the History of Ideas 430, 432.  
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he is utterly free to do what he will with the thing that he owns, in other words, there is an expectation 
on his part in enjoying every advantage that he can take from the ownership of his property, fulfilling 
Bentham’s vision of property. Presumably then, this indefinite liberty to use or dispose of the subject 
includes the right to destroy.  
Ius abudenti, while having its roots in Roman law, is reflected in traditional Anglo-American 
conception of property rights, which generally recognises the principle of full liberal ownership. In 
other words, a property owner possesses the thing owned so fully and completely that he is at liberty 
to do whatever he wishes with it, as described by Austin and Bentham above. JS Mill was apparently 
of the opinion that it was “just and expedient to exercise absolute control – the ius utendi et abutendi – 
over movable wealth”.49 Ius abudenti thus reflects the ultimate act a property owner may inflict on his 
property: utter destruction. If the property owner may destroy his property with impunity, then he 
clearly has the right to do less dramatic things to his property.  
Tony Honore, in his essay Ownership, famously lists 11 necessary incidents of ownership 
under the liberal concept, one of which is no. 5 in the list, the Right to the Capital, which he describes 
as “the power to alienate the thing and the liberty to consume, waste or destroy the whole or part of 
it”.50 The question as to the extent of an absolute right to waste or destroy is questioned very briefly 
by Honore, following his description of the right to the capital: “the latter liberty [i.e. to waste or 
destroy] need not be regarded as unrestricted” and he goes on to observe “but a general provision 
requiring things to be conserved in the public interest, so far as not consumed by use in the ordinary 
way, would perhaps be inconsistent with the liberal idea of ownership.”51 On the one hand he does 
acknowledge that such a right to waste or destroy may be restricted, and yet on the other, that this 
does not accord with his liberal conception of ownership.52  
The main point is that Honore does acknowledge that the right to destroy may well have 
restrictions. The questions as to what these restrictions are and why we should have them, considering 
that we are supposed to have full liberal ownership of our property, are unfortunately not dwelled 
upon by Honore as he merely says that “most people do not wilfully destroy permanent assets” 
anyway. 53 Similarly, Epstein thinks that the risk of people destroying their physical assets is small.54 
However, their assumption that most people do not wilfully destroy their assets, while based on 
perhaps a fairly reasonable observation of ordinary people in general, has not taken into account the 
numerous incidents involving the maiming, destruction or neglect of works of art throughout history, 
                                                          
49 ibid.  
50 Honore (note 9 above) p. 372. 
51  ibid. 
52 This tentative view by Honore is noted by McCaffery in McCaffery (note 7 above) p. 80. 
53 McCaffery explains Honore’s views on the basis that Honore deemed the fact of waste to be unimportant:  
ibid., p. 80.  
54 Richard Epstein, ‘Justice across the Generations’ (1989) 67 Texas Law Review 1465, 1487. 
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many of which involve masterpieces by renowned artists.55 Even though it is well known that many 
artworks by established artists, certainly those by renowned masters, not only command considerable 
value but also maintain and in many cases appreciate in value, this has not prevented the owners of art 
works, whether private individuals or museums, from destroying or neglecting their charges. As such, 
it is clear that market forces and an appreciation of the value of such works do not always prevent 
injury to art works.56  
Strahilevitz argues that we should have the liberty to destroy, if only to give full countenance 
to our ownership of our property, which in turn underscores our sense of security and liberty with our 
very own lives,57 and indeed benefit society generally in that the freedom to destroy values our right 
to privacy, encourages innovation and risk-taking.58 He writes that judicial treatment of our right to 
destroy, certainly in the US courts at least, has been inconsistent, as for example, the courts allow the 
destruction of organs and foetuses, notwithstanding their value to scientific research and to patients in 
need of transplants,59 but disallow in some cases, the destruction of houses and personal items.60 He 
also makes the point that destruction may also be an expressive act, for example, the person toppling 
the statue of a dictator expresses his anger at the repression signified by the statue and thus is an 
expressive act. To prevent this destructive act would be to curtail the destructor’s freedom of 
expression.61  
However, Strahilevitz does recognise that destruction achieves little on balance – the act is 
final and how is the creator of the destroyed work able to respond to the message deployed by the act 
of destruction?62 “Destroying a unique irreplaceable piece of property is...closer to heckling than to 
responding to what he [i.e. the creator of the property] has to say”.63 Throughout his piece, 
Strahilevitz takes issue with Sax’s position but in the end analysis, even though he is a strong 
advocate of the right to destroy, he is still hesitant about its wholesale application to situations 
involving valuable, “unique and irreplaceable” works.   
There is therefore a substantial case for restricting the right to destroy in situations involving 
unique and irreplaceable works such as works of art. It is unfortunate that Honore and Epstein do not 
confront the risk or consequences of destruction in more depth, but instead simply brush it aside on 
the basis that the risk, although real, is small, primarily on the basis that people would not destroy 
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valuable works. As already pointed out above, their observation does not bear up considering the 
number of not only art works, but also other valuable creative works,64 which have been destroyed 
throughout history. Further, although Strahilevitz makes a cogent case for the right to destroy, even he 
falters where valuable and unique works are concerned. McCaffery questions the wisdom and 
necessity of having such a right as ius abutendi, labelling it “an embarrassment” as it gives the owner 
the right to destroy valuable resources without justification.65  
In any event, there is precedent for the curtailing of property rights in modern property law. It 
has long be recognised that property rights are not absolute as illustrated bv the following examples: 
the ownership of listed buildings; land ownership subject to laws such as nuisance and the Rylands v 
Fletcher rule; real covenants etc. Clearly, property rights may, in the right circumstances, be 
restrained in the public interest. Therefore, if the purpose of moral rights is to serve the public interest, 
then likewise, they pose a valid reason for the curtailment of property rights in certain circumstances 
at least.66   
In the sections which follow, an argument will be made for the value of the arts to society, and 
why the arts should be regarded as a common good or a public interest. Further, if the arts are truly in 
the public interest or are a common good, then an argument will be made for the stewardship of the 
arts.  
IV. OWNERSHIP OF ART: CONFLICTING RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Eminent art historian, Professor Julius Held, explained away the various acts of mutilation and 
destruction meted out to art works over the centuries as the “widespread conviction that works of art 
owned by a private person are his undisputed property and that he can do with them exactly as he 
pleases”.67 As such, Held exhorted that the legal relationship of art to private ownership needed to be 
clearly defined.  
Professor Sax has heeded this clarion call and taken up the mantle as an advocate for the 
imposition of responsibilities and obligations upon the owners of not only fine art, but also other 
important cultural treasures, such as personal letters penned by historical or important figures or 
presidential papers.  He not only advocates a bar on destruction, but also calls for access, not 
necessarily full and unqualified, to works of historical, scientific or cultural importance.  In his section 
on the fine arts, with which this article is primarily concerned, among the examples discussed were 
the Rockefellers’ destruction of Diego de Rivera’s mural, Man at the Crossroads, and Sutherland’s 
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portrait of Churchill. Both cases are difficult ones because the first involved the artist’s 
commissioning patron, while the second involved an unflattering portrait of an important figure.  
The conflicting rights of the parties involved are plain to see, and differ from the more 
unlikely scenario of an eccentric billionaire disposing of his Renoir. While the latter may argue that 
his personal property rights are sacred, the other parties have other rights which go beyond mere 
proprietary rights. The Rockefellers were understandably perturbed with the communist propaganda 
emanating from the mural, and hence did not want to be associated with the same. Being a 
commissioning patron of the mural, it would have indicated that the Rockefellers were behind the 
communist sentiments portrayed within. As for Winston Churchill, he was repulsed by the way he 
was portrayed, basically as an old man in his twilight years, no longer the great wartime leader that he 
once was. The conflict here is thus the right of the important subject who wishes to manage the way 
he is portrayed publicly with that of the artist’s own vision of the subject.   
Apart from Strahilevitz, other scholars have also disagreed with Sax on his call for a legal ban 
on destruction. After all, they argue, there are many social deterrents against destruction in place. Hall 
notes at least two.68 Firstly, the prohibitive financial loss inflicted by the destruction of a work of art, 
especially if it is by an important artist.69 Secondly, the public outcry at such an act.70 In Honore’s 
view, highlighted above, most people simply would not wilfully destroy their possessions anyway, 
and that is basically why academics have dismissed any problems which might arise from the wilful 
destruction of property.  
It is submitted that this is only a perception, and simply a reasonable expectation of how 
reasonable people are likely to behave. The problem is that it is equally likely that there are a 
considerable number of unreasonable or simply unpredictable people who are in possession of 
important or valuable items. Just because it is perceived that reasonable people are unlikely to destroy 
their possessions including culturally important ones, it is no reason not to consider a legal solution to 
the problem. There are after all a fair number of cases involving the destruction of important works by 
reasonable parties, whether based on seemingly reasonable grounds (e.g. the removal of Richard 
Serra’s Tilted Arc,71 or the demolition of 5Pointz72) or more personal subjective ones (e.g. the burning 
of Sutherland’s portrait of Churchill or the destruction of Rivera’s mural). Further, a legal solution is 
also required mainly because of the extent of the loss to society in the event a work of art is destroyed. 
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Indeed, is this not reflected in the second of Hall’s two social deterrents: the public outcry. It is firstly 
doubted that a public outcry would necessarily be an effective deterrent to one who is determined to 
destroy anyway, and secondly, a public outcry surely reflects the depth of feeling on the part of 
society when something like this happens, and hence suggests that this is a serious problem at least, 
which requires a solution.  
Sax’s solution thus is that there should be “qualified ownership founded on the recognition 
that some objects are constituent of a community, and that ordinary private dominion over them 
insufficiently accounts for the community’s rightful stake in them”. One question is what objects are 
considered to be “constituent of a community”, and why. In particular, the focus of this article is on 
works of art, and the question is whether they are “constituent of a community” and hence require 
special consideration. Although Sax does not explicitly make reference to the concept of common 
good, it is arguably what he had in mind in framing his argument in Playing Darts with a Rembrandt. 
Joseph Sax was after all a prominent environmental lawyer, passionate about the public rights to 
natural resources. In arguing that natural resources, such as land and water, are a public trust, 
requiring special protection, he drew inspiration from Roman Law and English common law, and 
argued against expansive private rights at the expense of public interest. His foray into cultural 
material is argued along the same vein, that works of art and other goods of cultural importance 
should be subject to a kind of public trust, entrusted to guardianship, stewardship and similar notions. 
Arjo Klamer, professor of cultural economics, not only explains why the arts are a common 
good from an economics point of view, but more pertinently, explains why a private owner of a work 
of art, who experiences the value of the common good in the art he owns, would willingly invest more 
in and take responsibility for that art. According to him, the more valuable the common good in 
question, the more willingly would participants contribute to the common good.73  
The next section thus continues with a discussion of the notion of the public interest/common 
good as it applies to the arts, drawing from a diverse variety of sources, ranging from Aristotle and 
Aquinas to contemporary property theorists. 
V. THE VALUE OF THE ARTS TO SOCIETY – IS IT A PUBLIC INTEREST/COMMON 
GOOD DESERVING OF STEWARDSHIP 
Dr Werner Jerke, a renowned collector of Polish contemporary works, in a recent interview echoed 
Goethe’s sentiments: 
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In my opinion, if someone is an owner of a piece of art, it’s not only his property. The 
masterpiece belongs to society in general and I’m only lucky to keep it for a moment.74 
A work of art thus “belongs to society in general” and is the “property of mankind” in the words 
of Jerke and Goethe respectively. The ethos behind these exhortations reflect the idea that artworks 
are of such important benefit and value to humanity that the few individuals in possession of them 
only hold them in trust for the rest of society and future generations. In other words, owners of art 
should act as stewards rather than as outright owners in possession of all the property rights which 
private ownership normally entails. The argument thus put forth in this article is that, if art owners are 
no more than stewards, then in contemplating the tension between the integrity right and the owner’s 
rights in the art work, the courts should tread carefully in usurping any of the artist’s rights, including 
and perhaps especially any possible right to object to the destruction of his work. This section thus 
firstly and briefly explores the general idea of what is a common good or public interest, as well as the 
concept of stewardship, before moving on to consider if art and culture are indeed a common good.  
A. Stewardship based on the Public Interest/the Common Good 
The aim here is to formulate and justify a clear argument for the stewardship of art works on the basis 
that they are in the public interest and/or a common good. The questions are firstly why stewardship is 
a more appropriate form of holding for certain types of property, secondly, what are the common 
features of such property, and thirdly, whether art and other types of cultural property fall within such 
categories of property, hence qualifying for stewardship.   
In terms of legal regulation over property, discussions of the concepts of stewardship and the 
public interest have traditionally centred primarily on their application to natural resources. Further, 
until recently, legal debates over property ownership have been dominated by rights and entitlements 
discourse.75 However, in tandem with a growing and acute awareness of urgent environmental and 
sustainability issues, in recent academic work on property rights, in particular those over land, the 
stewardship model of property has begun to emerge as the dominant theory, over the liberal or 
absolute property rights model in general.76  One reason is the recognition that land ownership as 
practically conceived is subject to such a range of constraints that it is incompatible with notions of 
private property rights, which embraces full and unencumbered rights of control, exclusion and 
alienation. Another reason is the recognition that certain resources are not only scarce but lie also 
within a community’s interests to be maintained not only for the community but also future 
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generations.77 Further, there has been a growing recognition that indigenous cultural heritage and land 
deserve special recognition on the basis that they belong to “peoples” rather than individual persons, 
and hence are more appropriately the subject of stewardship rather than liberal property rights, which 
narrowly conceived, focuses on strong individual rights and entitlements.78      
According to Lucy and Mitchell,79 stewardship with its connotations of duties and obligations, 
is wholly incompatible with private property rights. They reject any suggestion that ownership of land 
is a combination of private property rights and stewardship. What they suggest is that private property 
is “conceptually and normatively inappropriate” in accounting for the ownership of land,80 and that 
stewardship instead fully and accurately accounts for any possession of land, in other words, 
stewardship provides a more accurate description of the actuality of the rights and obligations to 
which land owners are usually subject, for example, statutory constraints such as planning restrictions 
or common law ones such as those imposed by the law of nuisance or the Rylands v Fletcher rule.81 
This however was not the sole aim of their thesis; Lucy and Mitchell make it clear that by recognising 
land ownership as a form of stewardship rather than the “do with it as we please”82 form of private 
property, it helps to bridge the expectations of land owners and their actual experience.83  
The ownership of art, similarly, is already encumbered with certain legal constraints in 
actuality. For example, unless copyright ownership has also been transferred along with the property 
in the art work itself, the art owner may not make any copies of his property. Even more intrusive 
where the art owner is concerned are the moral right of attribution, whereby the artist must be 
identified whenever his work is exhibited,84 and the droit de suite, whereby the artist is entitled to 
receive a portion of the price for which his work is resold.85 These constraints are undoubtedly beyond 
those exhorted by the general ancient maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your own 
property as not to injure that of another);86 they actually impose certain positive obligations on the 
part of the art owner. Not only must an art owner ensure that the artist is fully and properly identified 
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each time he exhibits his property, he must also relinquish part of his total takings in the event he sells 
on his property.  
Similar to the aims of Lucy and Mitchell’s article, the aims of this article are firstly to 
articulate a clearer and more appropriate understanding of the legal nature of art ownership, so as to 
bridge the expectations of art owners and their experience, and secondly, to also counter the 
“widespread conviction that works of art owned by a private person are his undisputed property and 
that he can do with them exactly as he pleases” as lamented by Professor Held.  
Lucy and Mitchell however reject the idea that public interest accounts for the range of duties 
and obligations that accompany the ownership of land, on the basis that public interest is too vague to 
define. This is where this article and theirs diverge. While it is conceded that the concept of public 
interest is rather amorphous and difficult to grasp, nevertheless, it is contended that this in itself 
should not preclude the role it plays in property ownership. Richard Barnes, like Lucy and Mitchell, in 
examining the ownership of natural resources such as the ocean or fisheries,87 argues that stewardship 
is an alternative regime for property holding, although unlike them, he argues that the public interest 
plays a profound role in the formulation of stewardship as a form of property holding. Underpinning 
his argument is the recognition that property ownership is a social institution, serving public interests. 
He counters the arguments raised by Lucy and Mitchell by arguing that although the notion of public 
interest is at first view a difficult one to pin down, and indeed there appears to be little scholarly 
agreement as to the precise content of public interest,88 nevertheless it is possible to construct a 
coherent framework in which we can determine whether or not certain claims are in the public 
interest.89 Barnes’ interest lies in natural resources and in this regard he argues that they comprise 
what he terms as “first order interests”, 90 i.e. according to him, public interests which meet the 
physical needs of a community essential for their survival.91 Although he barely refers to other types 
of subject matter beyond natural resources, he does acknowledge the existence of other community 
interests, the securing of which stewardship may have a role to play, which includes the community’s 
aesthetic interests or cultural values,92 thus underpinning the arguments set out in this article.  
This article is clearly not concerned with questioning the appropriateness of applying the 
concept of stewardship to the holding of land or natural resources, but instead, drawing from Barnes’ 
scholarship, it endeavours to argue that the public interest is sufficiently defined and capable of 
underlining the features of stewardship, and that it includes a community’s aesthetic interests or 
cultural values.  Further, it wishes to draw from property scholarship, such notions and principles of 
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stewardship which have been applied to land holding, but which also may be readily transferable and 
applied to the arts and cultural heritage, as well as the idea that there is undoubtedly a public interest 
in the arts.  
The idea of the common good, and in particular, how it should be so treated also assists in 
informing the discussions central to this article. Essentially, it will be seen that the notions of common 
good will explain how best art owners should act in respect of their art collections vis a vis the 
community in which they reside. It is firstly necessary to clarify the meaning of the common good, a 
term which is generally used interchangeably with public interest.93 There is, as conceded above, little 
scholarly agreement on the precise meaning of either public interest,94 or common good.95 That the 
terms may be regarded as synonymous with each other is certainly accepted by Amitai Etzioni, who 
describes the common good as those “that serve all members of a given community and its 
institutions, and...that serve no identifiable particular group, ...[and] members of generations not yet 
born”,96 an approach adopted by this article. Although there are subtle variations of the common good, 
ranging from the common good as historically developed by Plato and Aristotle and later in Christian 
theology, notably by Aquinas, and later in economics, law and political theory, the common feature is 
that recognition of the common good is not only good for the community at large, but is also good for 
each and every member of that community including property owners themselves.  
This article is underpinned by the teachings of Aristotle, Aquinas and Etzioni on the common 
good in the following way.  Firstly, it should be understood that the manner of property holding 
advocated by Aristotle is important in fulfilling an important goal: that of living a fulfilling, proper 
and moral life ultimately. Aristotle argued that man is a social and political being, who has to live 
harmoniously within the community, in relation to his fellow citizens.97 In order for a person therefore 
to flourish and live a rich and complex life, he has to engage in virtuous activities which enable him to 
live harmoniously with his fellow citizens, contributing to the ultimate goal of a fulfilling, proper and 
moral life. Where property is concerned therefore, private ownership can contribute to human 
flourishing if it is also exercised with generosity. In other words, private ownership gives a person 
power over a thing, but if he chooses not to exercise that power, and instead generously shares his 
possession willingly with others, he is acting with virtue, which contributes to his well-being and 
allows him to flourish in turn. In the context of this article therefore, it is in the interests of the art 
owner and the community in which he resides, to generously “share” his collection of art works with 
his fellow members of the community. Only then will he flourish according to Aristotelian ideals.      
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Aquinas, in developing his common good theory, sees no contradiction between private 
interests and public interests, and proposes that the common good may be achieved without 
necessarily alienating individual or private goods.98 While Aquinas’ views are set within a theological 
framework, and that as a matter of theology, Aquinas may not have sanctioned private property,99 he 
nevertheless justified it on the basis that possessions will be more carefully looked after and that 
property affairs will be administered in a more orderly fashion,100 which reflects the views of Aristotle 
as set out above. Further, Aquinas sees private property as being “useful to the achievement of the 
common good”.101  As such, where property is concerned, the issue with which this article is most 
concerned, he thought that property should be privately owned and managed but also readily shared 
for the public good.102  
Hence, following on from this, if we accept that a work of art is a common good, the owner of 
such a culturally important work can enjoy private ownership and possession of the same but also has 
a duty to ensure that the public benefits from it too, which in turn means a duty to protect and preserve 
art works in their charge.    
B. Are the Arts a Common Good/in the Public Interest? 
The public interest is a notion which, as already mentioned above, is difficult to define, and arguably 
vague according to Lucy and Mitchell. Even an article entitled “The Public Interest in the Arts” 
published in the Yale Law Journal in 1981,103 neither specifies what this public interest is, nor why 
there should be a public interest in the arts, but nevertheless proceeds on the assumption that there is a 
public interest in the arts. However, as discussed above, Barnes has formulated a stable framework in 
which to measure the extent to which a good is in the public interest, which as we have seen above, 
includes aesthetic interests and cultural values. 
Although the notion of the public interest or common good may be vague, the notion that 
there is a public interest in the arts is widely and commonly accepted. For instance, the argument that 
the arts or at least cultural values are held as a good of the very highest order can be found in 
teachings of the Christian church, which as mentioned above, is a source of common good theory. 
Sison and Fontrodona have, by referring to Puelles’ commentary on church social teachings, 
identified cultural values, defined as “technical, artistic, intellectual, ethical and spiritual goods” as 
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being important for “authentic human flourishing”.104 Although cultural values may not present 
themselves with the same urgency as material well-being or peace and concord, they are nevertheless 
deemed to be superior to these needs as they appeal to the higher aspirations of man.105 Material well-
being and peace and concord are all needs only because they allow people to participate in cultural 
activities.     
Merryman argues passionately that there is an intrinsic quality in the arts which we all value, 
empirical evidence of which lie in the very fact that there are thousands of museums and galleries, 
thousands of dealers, millions of visitors to museums and concert attendees, multitudes of university 
departments devoted to the arts, public organisations representing the arts, laws in place for the 
protection of cultural heritage and many other entities which exist to protect, serve, and facilitate the 
generation, display and performance of the arts.106 Merryman further supports his argument by 
referring to the establishment of moral rights laws.  He identifies a dual purpose in these laws: one to 
protect the individual artist against alteration or destruction of his work and another to protect the 
public against alteration or destruction of their culture.107  
More importantly Merryman makes the point that the regard for cultural objects is universal. 
He argues that although certain objects or works are treated with reverence only within the culture to 
which they belong, and not particularly by others outside their culture, nevertheless we can all 
appreciate the “human component” in all cultural objects and understand its profound value to 
cultures to which these objects belong, and thus in such a way, we all value all cultural objects, 
whether or not they belong to our particular cultural landscape.108 
Along these same lines, Elsen argues “art is a powerful force for uniting a society”109 and 
quotes from the 1954 Hague Convention that “damage to cultural property belonging to any people 
whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each person makes its 
contribution to the culture of the world.”110 Stephen Ladas, in 1938, recognised that the “maintenance 
and preservation of a work of art is invested with the public interest in culture and development of the 
arts.”111 
We return to Merryman for he is the one who provides us with the most comprehensive case for 
recognising the public interest in the arts or that the arts are a common good. Briefly, he argues that 
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there is “truth and certainty” in the authentic original objects and that to destroy or alter them would 
be to tamper with such “truth” to which we are entitled.112 He also sees a “morality” in cultural 
objects,113 as well as a repository of “cultural memory”.114 Cultural objects evoke emotions and 
possess “pathos” and as they have the capacity to outlive us, they represent “humanity’s mark on 
eternity”.115 Finally, cultural objects help us create an “identity” and also encourages our participation 
in a “common human enterprise” as artists create a painting to be seen by others, or a pot to be used 
by others.116  
VI. WHAT RIGHTS, IF ANY, DO WORKS OF ART THEMSELVES POSSESS? 
Another angle from which the debates surrounding the right to object to destruction may proceed is 
the following viewpoint taken by certain philosophers in the US, i.e. that artworks possess rights. The 
range of potential rights discussed, vary from the right to be interpreted correctly,117 and the right not 
to be modified,118 to the right to be restored,119 all of which would bear some relation to the integrity 
right. Where the theme of this article is concerned, if there is any possibility that artworks themselves 
arguably possess rights, including a right not to be destroyed, then such a possibility firstly 
emphasises the unique properties of art works as opposed to those of more ordinary possessions, and 
secondly, it then follows that art works, being unique items which bear their own rights, should be 
more properly subject to stewardship, rather than the whims of private property ownership.  
The most controversial and prominent advocate of the argument that art works bear rights is 
Professor Alan Tormey, who in his article Aesthetic Rights, posits that “art works are bearers of a 
special class of rights”. In a nutshell, his conclusion is based on an observation of the way in which 
human beings regard art, and of the ‘aesthetic pain’ experienced in the event a work of art is 
maltreated. It follows that as all rational beings are obliged to prevent such pain, and that artworks 
impose this particular obligation, such artworks in turn bear rights. In the article, Professor Tormey 
professes that he is not interested in the justification for such rights, but only in asserting that art 
works de facto have such rights. He brushes aside very quickly any objection that insensate beings 
may have rights by simply referring to obvious examples such as corporations and nations, which are 
generally accepted to have rights. He understands that the most fundamental objection to his thesis 
lies in the fact that the aesthetic pain experienced through a maltreatment of a work is felt by 
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interested parties, such as the artist, performer, art-lover or collector, and therefore, such aesthetic 
rights, as there may be, belong to them, not the work itself.  However, he counters this by reiterating 
that “it is the work itself that is affronted, distorted, defamed, maligned, insulted or done violence to – 
not the artist, the performer, or the public, even though their interests may suffer...”.  
Tormey’s thesis has been objected to by fellow philosophers. James Young in exploring the 
question of whether it is always wrong to destroy art works, takes issue with Tormey’s contention that 
artworks bear rights.120 Young claims that artworks themselves do not suffer from the abuse of art and 
therefore cannot bear rights. Another philosopher, Goldblatt, questions Tormey’s refusal to engage 
with the justification of such rights, claiming that only the justification of obligations can ensure that 
such obligations ought to be fulfilled, and that it is no use to only establish de facto rights. Like 
Young, Goldblatt contends that if it is only art lovers and similarly interested people who feel 
‘aesthetic pain’ when art is abused, then they are the ones who are entitled to such rights as there may 
be.  
Notwithstanding the numerous criticisms, the thesis introduced by Tormey is a stand which 
has been accepted to some extent by other philosophers, who may not necessarily have advocated 
fundamental rights akin to that of human rights, but have called for certain key rights, such as the 
right not to be modified or even a right to be restored. Tormey’s thesis only takes such calls a step 
further.  
Furthermore, while Goldblatt and Young are correct to say that as only artists and art lovers 
are the ones who feel ‘aesthetic pain’, they should be the bearers of such rights if any, not the 
artworks, it is arguable that people often feel or experience pain on behalf of another who has borne 
the injury. In other words, they feel the ‘aesthetic pain’ because it reflects the injury wrought on the 
cherished artwork – that does not make the injury suffered by the artwork any less real. As in the 
words of Richard Brilliant, editor of Art Bulletin, in drawing a comparison with our dumb animal 
companions, “Abused animals can reveal their distress with loud cries but art objects are voiceless. 
Just as animals require human champions to voice their right to “proper” treatment, so art objects 
deserve champions”.121  
It is not proposed, at this juncture, and for the purposes of this article, to put forth an entirely new 
normative basis on which to formulate rights for artworks, but it is only intended to bring attention to 
a body of work which has explored this issue, and to suggest that, in any serious contemplation of 
moral rights and the ownership of art, the possibility that artworks may bear fundamental rights 
should not be dismissed so easily.  
                                                          
120 James Young, ‘Destroying Works of Art’ (1989) 47 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 367. 
121 Brilliant (note 39 above). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
We have seen thus far that there is a strong case for treating art and other cultural works as a common 
good, not in the sense as a good which commonly belongs to all in a Marxist sense, but as a common 
good more along the lines developed by Aquinas, i.e. a good for all members of a community. 
Furthermore, according to Aquinas, private property was completely acceptable, save that such 
holding of property also entails a duty to manage them for the good of the community at large. 
Aquinas’ common good is closely aligned to the public interest, and indeed there can be little doubt 
that cultural works are in the public interest; they not only represent the “truth” for mankind as 
Merryman contends, but they are essential for “authentic human flourishing”, an important aim of any 
subject matter which vies as a common good in the Aristotle or Thomastic sense.  
There is an appreciation that artistic works, as opposed to ordinary everyday objects, are 
different entities deserving of special treatment. Indeed, prior to the enactment of VARA, when the 
American courts were mainly opposed to the recognition of moral rights doctrine, there was 
nevertheless judicial appreciation of the fact that perhaps cultural works were different and needed 
special protection. Justice Seabury articulated such a view by saying that the sale of an artistic work 
was quite different from the sale of a barrel of pork, in that while the pork seller is not interested in 
whatever happens to his barrel after he has disposed of it, an artist is not only interested in what 
happens to his work after sale, but is indeed entitled to see that it is dealt with in a manner which is 
acceptable to him.122  
The perception that works of art possess special and unique qualities which qualify them for 
special protection in the public interest is further supported by the possibility that artworks themselves 
bear rights. It then follows that if such works are in the public interest or indeed a common good, they 
have to be treated differently to other more prosaic types of property, and are more properly the 
subject of stewardship than outright property ownership. This in turn means that owners of art works 
are more properly stewards of these works, rather than outright property owners with absolute rights 
over them including the right to maim or destroy them. 
In accepting that the ownership of art is more properly stewardship with all its connotations of 
preserving and maintaining such works for the present community and future generations, then it 
seems incongruous that moral rights doctrine should then fail to recognise the creator’s ability to 
object to the destruction of his works. It is incongruous because, as has already been argued above, 
moral rights doctrine ultimately serves the public interest too, not just individual creators. By 
recognising the artist’s right to object to the “ultimate form of mutilation”, moral rights doctrine thus 
ensures that artists are encouraged to create in the knowledge that the law is on their side and that it 
                                                          
122 Referred to in the title to this article. Judgment in Clemens v Press Pub. Co., 122 N.Y. Supp. 206, at 207-08, 
referred to in Lee (n 31) p. 277. 
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serves to protect their creations, which in turn, sends a powerful message to those who possess art that 
art is to be cherished, nurtured and protected, and that they are stewards, not mere owners, of our 
cultural heritage.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
